The fact that Volodymyr Zelensky was invited to Ankara and that a comprehensive agreement was signed worried Moscow, and economic sanctions were reintroduced as if there had been no cooperation between Turkey and Russia since August 24, 2016: it is not surprising that the first area is tourism. Because the first area of sanctions imposed after the plane was shot down on November 24, 2015, was also tourism.

If the scope of sanctions is expanded, two aspects of Russia's view of Turkey will be resolved: 1) The emphasis on unilateral ambitions, rather than bilateral and equal cooperation with Turkey; 2) Being an unreliable partner arising from this ambition. Both are well known to people who are old enough and sane to remember the Soviet era.

As the agreement with Ukraine will not be annulled, Moscow may include international cooperation in the scope of sanctions in the future. Because Turkey, of which withdrawal from the US F-35 program become definite on April 21, was forced before this to announce that it would not include the S-400 missiles, which it had bought from Russia, into the inventory of the army that would install them anywhere under pressure from Washington, which led to the failure of some plans, which were important for Moscow in several respects. Therefore, from the Kremlin's point of view, we are talking about opening serious gaps in cooperation.

After the killing of 57 Turkish soldiers by Russian forces in Idlib on February 27, 2020, President Erdoğan said for several days in a row that the "Astana process" was over. Therefore, in response to the comprehensive agreement signed with Ukraine, the process may go up to Russia's demand to "leave Syria".

Most likely, Ankara took all this into account and sought to open the door to dialogue with Cairo behind the scenes after the agreement with Ukraine.

Without ever discussing the functionality of the Turkish-Russian "observation center" established in Aghdam earlier this year, let the opposition, ferried around by a bus by Adalat Valiyev, think about the symbolic fate of that center, which is of no importance to Moscow...

Despite the fact that 3 months have passed since the handover, the fact that there is no news from the other side of the ocean reminds of a motive in Jalil Mammadguluzadeh's "Stories of Danabash village" (orig. “Danabaş kəndinin əhvalatları”): The devastated situation of uncle Mammadhasan, who went to the outskirts of the village every day and waited for the return of landlord Khudayar bey (he is the grandfather of Nazim, a former landlord of the diaspora) after landlord took his donkey and went to Karbala, prevails in Ankara today. To see how long this situation will last, two factors need to be kept in mind: 1) Whether the US president will use the word "genocide" in his April 24 address; 2) The extent to which the name of the Turkish leadership will be mentioned in the Halkbank lawsuit, the second part of which is expected to begin in New York, and how much the White House will care. There are days left to see them...

The ruling party is facing a rating problem, while the government is facing serious problems, especially in the economic sphere. The reasons for the "disappearance" of $ 128 billion from the Central Bank's foreign exchange reserves seem to be clear after serious controversy: it is clear from the statements of government officials that the Central Bank has signed agreements with the Treasury, and the Treasury has signed agreements with several banks, and the reserve currency was sold that way.

The CHP and IYI Party, which did not find the statements on the issue, which is a good opportunity for the opposition, satisfactory, fire off questions to the government, saying: 1) Why did the Central Bank sell the currency not directly but through the Treasury and banks? 2) If a part of the $ 128 billion was sold to interfere in the foreign exchange market, and a part was sold for the debts of companies, then who bought the rest? Because whoever bought it has a revenue of $ 25 billion, disclose their names. At a time when ratings are upside down, while the opposition's sending salvos to the government through "money" has made the situation even more annoying, changes in the government have been met with frustration by society.

As soon as the Minister of Commerce, Ruhsar Pekcan, who was in Baku not so long ago but two weeks ago (how symbolic, isn't it?), returned to the country, Odatv, the most influential website in politics, documented that "about $ 1.2 million worth of disinfectants were sold to the ministry from the minister's family company," and the president was forced to fire the minister. This fact once again showed that it is impossible to kill the media in countries like Turkey. Let those 150 journalists, ferried around to Aghdam, think about it...

Changes in the rating scales in accordance with the functional dynamics of democracy are proof that the regime is alive in Turkey. One of President Erdoğan's most important features is that he has several public opinion poll company conducted public opinion polls at least twice a month and identifies new steps based on the results.

Partisanship in public opinion polls is tantamount to suicide (For example, Adil Gür, known as a reliable public opinion pollster for nearly 10 years, destroyed both himself and his company on the eve of the 2019 municipal elections, claiming that the ruling party would receive 60% of the vote in a completely subjective way). Therefore, Mr. Erdoğan is taking steps by analyzing the results of public opinion polls that his party did not order. The political system is becoming more active as more and more public opinion polls show that the ruling party has almost failed to raise its rating. Let's entrust this to Zahid Oruj and continue to be enlightened from the opposition, journalism, and public opinion polls of “that glorious place by the sea”.

The only issues left are science, literature, book sales: we will do stuff (i.e. write).

Mayis Alizade

Source - Turan.az

29 April 2021 / 10:03