Everyone who follows the current military phase of the 30-year Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict could notice the interest of analysts in the possibility of a military clash between Russia and Turkey in the light of Azerbaijan's current operation to liberate its territories from the occupation of Armenia.

The possibility of such a clash was intensified by the actions of the Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan, who tried to drag the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), that is, Russia, into the conflict. For this, missile attacks were even undertaken from the territory of Armenia on the cities of Azerbaijan in order to cause fire on themselves and thereby justify Russia's invasion of the conflict on the side of Armenia in accordance with the collective security treaty.

However, the Kremlin initially outlined the restrictive framework for its intervention in the military conflict, making it clear that it interacts with Ankara in the region and is in  no hurry to make emergency decisions. Subsequently, this line of conduct remained stable.

On October 5, the press secretary of the President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Peskov outlined the position of Moscow. "The dialogue between Russia and Azerbaijan and Turkey on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh is being carried out at a high level and on an ongoing basis," he said. He did not rule out, if necessary, telephone conversations between President Vladimir Putin and the leaders of Azerbaijan and Turkey, Ilham Aliyev and Tayyip Erdogan on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. “If it is necessary, there is no doubt that President Putin will discuss this topic with his counterparts,” said Peskov.

He also answered the question whether such contacts are possible this week. “There are no such clear plans yet, but the talk is about a war, and, of course, the situation in Karabakh is developing rapidly, so it is difficult to guess here. Depending on how the circumstances develop the needs for dialogue will also form,” said the representative for President Putin.

Subsequently, there were such dialogues, but they once again demonstrate the coordinated actions of Moscow and Ankara in the military actions in Karabakh, the development of which clearly demonstrates the mutual understanding of the two powers in the region on the indicated problem. Iran, which for the first time demanded the withdrawal of the occupying forces of Armenia from Azerbaijan, also supported this line.

In general, the Turkish-Russian relations of the last 5 years have taken on a situational character and both powers successfully interact in various kinds of conflicts in the region of the Near East. A vivid example of this is Turkey's invasion of Iraq and Syria in 2015, direct involvement in the Libyan conflict, where Russia and Turkey act as some kind of military-political balancers.

Ten days before the start of the operation of the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan to de-occupy the territories seized by Armenia, following negotiations on September 14-15 in Ankara, Russia and Turkey reached an agreement on the Libyan issue, that is, its joint settlement of the crisis, proceeding from the zones of influence and interests in this country.

Earlier, the same interaction was recorded in Syria, where it was possible to stabilize temporarily the situation in order to transfer it from a military to a political channel in the future.

Such a partnership became possible due to the special relationship between Moscow and Ankara after the collapse of two empires - the Ottoman and Russian, which for 600 years fought regional wars for the sphere of influence. One of these was the Caucasus, which passed from hand to hand, which left a mark in the relations of the two powers to the region, each of which claims its historical right of presence. For the past 100 years, Turkey and Russia have not clashed on the battlefield. This was largely facilitated by the desire of both countries to maintain relative independence in action, and even interact, despite their attachment to opposing military-political blocs and international obligations. This clearly manifested itself during the 1974 Cyprus crisis, when Turkey clashed with its NATO neighbor, Greece, but was supported by Moscow in opposition to the North Atlantic bloc, which allowed Ankara to prevent the plan of the Greek junta of "black colonels" to annex Cyprus to Greece and expel the Turks - Cypriots.

Bilateral cooperation intensified even more during the Putin-Erdogan era, when both leaders came to power at the beginning of the 21st century during an acute crisis in their countries with similar challenges, goals and actions for economic stabilization and preservation of the integrity of their states. In foreign policy, both leaders began to demonstrate defiantly conflicting relations between the European Union and the United States. This similar policy was based on the need for sovereign economic prosperity, internal stability and regional security, with a taste of the realization of foreign economic interests. In 2005, the doctrine of "sovereign democracy" even appeared in Russia. Although Turkey did not announce such a doctrine, but demonstratively sovereign actions, including in the development of the Mediterranean sea shelf, open political support for Azerbaijan demonstrate a certain independent course of Erdogan similar to Putin's.

In addition to the regional interests, which were mentioned above, and which link the interests of the two countries, bilateral trade and economic relations are considered no less important. According to statistics, the trade between Russia and Turkey in 2019 grew by 2.5% and exceeded $ 21 billion, of which Russia accounts for $ 17.75 billion, and Turkey - $ 3.46 billion. The peak trade turnover was in 2014 - $ 31 , 1 billion, but in 2015 it dropped to 19 billion due to the global crisis, and not because of the incident with the downed Russian SU-34, as many mistakenly believe. A sharp decline in trade and a slump in tourism was noted long before the plane crisis, Turan Analytical Service wrote about in the article "Russia-Turkey: Rapprochement is premature." 

The era of Putin-Erdogan is characterized by large deals that take into account mutual interests. The parties entered into a number of deals of strategic importance and long-term nature. We are talking about the construction of the first Turkish nuclear power plant "Akkuyu" worth $ 22 billion and the gas pipelines "Blue Stream" and "Turkish Stream" with a total supply of 31 billion cubic meters of gas in 2019, as well as supplies of Russian S-400 air defense systems to Turkey for $ 2.5 billion

The growing sympathy of Russians towards Turkey is evidenced by the record number of tourists who visited Turkish resorts in 2019 - more than 7 million, which brought Russia to the first place among the countries whose citizens make Turkish tours.

It should be noted that Moscow is nevertheless satisfied with the soft tread of "anti-Western" Turkey across the expanses of the former USSR and especially in the Turkic-speaking regions of Russia and the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus without prejudice to the political and economic interests of Russia. This is also, where situational alliances and peacekeeping projects arise, in which both sides interact. For example, ensuring the continuity of power in Azerbaijan in 2003, the Astana peace process on Syria, the settlement of crises in Kyrgyzstan, in the North and South Caucasus.

Turkey and Russia are Eurasian states and share the common features of the opposites and unity of the European and Asian civilizations, both in a geographical and political sense. What is interesting, in the mental sense, Russia is close to Europe, although its political system is close to the Asian one, and in Turkey, on the contrary - in the mental sense, it is closer to Asia, but it is part of the European political space. Perhaps these underlying factors form the civilizational imperatives of interaction and are the basis of the ability to negotiate and find common ground in two countries, regardless of the geography and political and economic significance of the issue.

Today the South Caucasus s not only the historical past of Turkey, but also its present. Now they are connected by the BTC oil pipeline, the BTZ gas pipeline, and the BTE Railway. They are joined by promising Russian and Iranian projects, the North-South railroad and gas pipelines. That is, the region is turning into a communicative hub of transport, energy and other interests that ensure both economic and political interests, at the head of which is regional stability. This is the main issue that allows creating favorable conditions for long-term development and ensuring mutual interests.

The production and transport hub of these strategic projects in the region is Azerbaijan, which has equidistant political and economic ties with the two powers and is able to form multi-vector regional ties and alliances with their participation. With the exception of Armenia, Azerbaijan has pragmatic and non-conflict relations with all neighbors of the Black Sea-Caspian region. However, in the development of projects in which Moscow and Ankara are interested, Yerevan is the main obstacle. Armenian politicians and public figures recognize the state of conflict between Armenia and all its neighbors represented by Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iran and Turkey. Armenia, as the main moderator of the Karabakh conflict, has become a deterrent to the realization of the interests of various countries in the region, and of course, first, the regional powers - Russia and Turkey. Therefore, it is not surprising that the legitimate actions of Azerbaijan find the overt support of Ankara and the tacit support of Moscow. The problem for Armenia is that it has put its own interests above the interests of all other countries, and its hostile regional policy has formed a tangle of contradictions in the region, which is high time to cut it up.

In the future, one should expect not a clash, but an intensification of interaction between Turkey and Russia in the region, especially after the settlement of the Karabakh conflict. The grounds for this are provided by the forecasts of both Russian and Turkish political circles, but also by the trends laid down by the Putin-Erdogan era. Expert on international relations, Dr. Gokmen Kilicoglu believes that Armenia is important for Russia in the Caucasus region, but Turkey has always been more important for her.

The Russian public figure and political scientist Sergei Markov writes, “The general trend in Russian-Turkish relations ... is that the two countries are increasingly focusing on strengthening their own sovereignty and increasing the independence of their domestic and foreign policies. Following these parallel courses, helping each other, Moscow and Ankara are getting closer and closer. Will cooperation continue on parallel courses, or will Russia and Turkey move from close partnership to allied ones? This question has not yet been answered. However, the possibility of Turkey joining the Eurasian Union cannot be ruled out. If this happens, the geopolitical map of Eurasia will radically change. "

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    Source - Turan 

29 October 2020 / 15:44